Zum EU-Gipfel

Großbritannien lehnt es ab, zur Rettung der Eurozone beizutragen. Ungarn macht ebenfalls nicht mit. Tschechien und Schweden wollen zuerst ihre nationalen Parlamente konsultieren. Eine Einigung aller 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten ist geplatzt. Merkel besteht auf EU-Vertragsveränderngen, für die keine Zeit bleiben, und die ohnehin keine hohen Durchsetzungschancen haben, weil sie bei einem Großteil der EU-Bevölkerung unpopulär sind. Die EZB hat neuerlich deutlich gemacht, dass sie nicht gewillt ist, als "lender of last resort" aufzutreten. ESFS und ESM werden aller Voraussicht nach nicht die notwendige Finanzkraft haben, um Problemstaaten wie Italien und Spanien mit ausreichenden Notfallgeldern zu stützen.

Felix Salmon spricht nicht umsonst von einem der denkbar schlechtesten Gipfeltreffen. Die Erwartungen waren hoch; sie wurden wieder einmal nicht erfüllt. Wie viele Chancen, das Worst Case Szenario zu verhindern, werden wohl noch kommen?

Wie stark ist die amerikanische Wirtschaft von der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Europa abhängig?

Dazu ein Chart via Tim Duy:

Griechen räumen ihre Sparkonten

Many Greeks are draining their savings accounts because they are out of work, face rising taxes or are afraid the country will be forced to leave the euro zone. By withdrawing money, they are forcing banks to scale back their lending -- and are inadvertently making the recession even worse. [...]

The hemorrhaging of bank savings has had a disastrous impact on the economy. Many companies have had to tap into their reserves during the recession because banks have become more reluctant to lend. More Greek families are now living off their savings because they have lost their jobs or have had their salaries or pensions cut.

In August, unemployment reached 18.4 percent. Many Greeks now hoard their savings in their homes because they are worried the banking system may collapse.

Quelle: Spiegel

Wie wäre es im Falle eines Zusammenbruchs der Eurozone um den Wert nationaler Währungen bestellt?

Once again it’s Nomura taking the plunge on covering the break-up issue. In his December 4 note, the bank’s FX analyst Jens Nordvig warned that conclusions about the value of a post-euro currencies would have to be extremely provisional:
... we want to stress up-front that these estimates are unlikely to be particularly precise. They are intended to give a sense of potential magnitudes involved over a 5-year forward time frame, after which we believe temporary transition effects should be smaller.
...
A eurozone break-up will create additional short-term risks and require new risk premia for investors. These extraordinary risk premia will vary by country depending on factors such as market volatility, liquidity conditions, as well as issues relating to capital controls, including possible taxes on capital flows. Since our analysis is focussed on equilibrium considerations over a 5-year period, we will not focus directly on these more temporary effects, although we recognize that they could be crucial in the short-term.

Quelle: FTAlphaville

Zinsen auf italienische Staatsanleihen sinken

Joe Weisenthal weist uns auf die heutige Entwicklung an den Anleihenmärkten hin:

The yields on the Italian 10-year has [sic!] fallen below 6.2%!

Just remember, it was just the week before Thanksgiving that the yield here was above 7.4%, so this is a huge move.

Obviously investors are reacting to the twin promises of new austerity as well as prospects of this week's euro crisis discussions.

Quelle: Business Insider

Erfreulich ist das. Aber sind die geringeren Zins-Spreads auch von einer nachhaltigen Natur?

Siehe auch: FTAlphaville

Staatsverschuldung vor und nach der Finanzkrise 2008/09

Paul Krugman stellt folgendes richtig:

[J]ust about every report states as a fact that excessive [sovereign] borrowing caused the crisis. [...] So, one more time, here are some data (from the IMF World Economic Outlook database). Debt as a % of GDP for Spain and Italy:

Before the crisis Spain had low and declining debt. Italy had high debt inherited from the past, but it was steadily working that debt down relative to GDP. Neither country was being profligate — that’s just not what happened. Since the crisis debt has been rising relative to GDP, but that’s what happens when you have an economic crisis.

Quelle: NYTimes

John Kay über Modelle und Prognosen

John Maynard Keynes, who never tried to conceal that he knew more than most people, also knew the limits to his knowledge. He wrote “about these matters – the prospect of a European war, the price of copper 20 years hence – there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.”

And Keynes was right. He published these observations in 1921, and 20 years later Britain was engaged in a desperate, and unpredictable, struggle with Germany.

But lesser men find prognostication easier. I have been looking at some of the models people use, in both the public and private sectors to predict events.

The models share a common approach. They pose the question: “How would we make our decision if we had complete knowledge of the world?” With such information you might make a detailed assessment drawing together many different pieces of relevant information on matters such as costs, benefits, and consequences.

But little of this knowledge exists. So you make the missing data up. You assume the future will be like the past, or you extrapolate a trend. Whatever you do, no cell on the spreadsheet may be left unfilled. If necessary, you put a finger in the air. [...]

The future is assumed to be essentially like the present, with differences mainly derived from mechanical projection of current developments. Uncertainty is ignored, or dealt with in unsatisfactory ways.

Quelle: John Kay