Christie Romer über Fiskalpolitik in den USA

The one thing that has disillusioned me is the discussion of fiscal policy. Policymakers and far too many economists seem to be arguing from ideology rather than evidence… [T]he evidence is stronger than it has ever been that fiscal policy matters—that fiscal stimulus helps the economy add jobs, and that reducing the budget deficit lowers growth at least in the near term. And yet, this evidence does not seem to be getting through to the legislative process.

That is unacceptable. We are never going to solve our problems if we can’t agree at least on the facts. Evidence-based policymaking is essential if we are ever going to triumph over this recession and deal with our long-run budget problems.

Quelle: Berkeley Paper

"Ein Problem, das man nur lösen kann, wenn man es mit Geld überhäuft"

The financial crisis in Europe, seemingly never-ending, has now entered a potentially disastrous phase. [...] there’s a real possibility that the euro zone might just break apart [...] Yet what’s easy to miss, amid the market tremors and the political brinksmanship, is that this is that rarest of problems—one that you really can solve just by throwing money at it.

To be sure, Italy and Spain have genuine troubles: their economies are weak and their debt loads are high. But these problems are manageable as long as the interest rate on their debt stays reasonably low. (This is in contrast to Greece, which had no hope of ever paying off all its debts.) Italy’s fiscal situation is not good, but it’s not much worse than it was a decade ago. Indeed, it’s one of only a small handful of countries in the developed world that are running a so-called primary surplus [...] The problem, then, isn’t the debt itself but, rather, the soaring interest rates, and these are driven more by fear than by economic fundamentals. [...] fear of default raises interest rates, and higher interest rates make default more likely.

The frustrating thing about all this is that there is a ready-made solution. If the European Central Bank were to commit publicly to backstopping Italian and Spanish debt, by buying as many of their bonds as needed, the worries about default would recede and interest rates would fall. This wouldn’t cure the weakness of the Italian economy or eliminate the hangover from the housing bubble in Spain, but it would avert a Lehman-style meltdown, buy time for economic reforms to work, and let these countries avoid the kind of over-the-top austerity measures that will worsen the debt crisis by killing any prospect of economic growth.

Quelle: The New Yorker

Paul Krugman mutmaßt über die zukünftige Geschichtsschreibung der Jahre 2010/2011

Future historians will look back in astonishment at the Great Pivot of 2010, in which all the Very Serious People on both sides of the Atlantic– and, sad to say, in both parties in the United States — decided that in the face of high unemployment, weak growth, and low inflation, what the world really needed was austerity.

Quelle: NYTimes

Reformüberlegungen zum Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt in der EU

Das Abstract eines Papers, das sich mit der prekären Lage der Europäischen Währungsunion und möglichen Gegenmaßnahmen befasst, liest sich folgendermaßen:

The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is a
symptom of policy failures and defi ciencies in –
among other things – fi scal policy coordination.
The first nine years of the euro were not used
effectively in order to improve public finances,
while the Stability and Growth Pact was
watered down. Spillovers from the financial and
economic crisis compounded fiscal difficulties
in the euro area, especially in certain member
countries. This paper looks back at the history
of fiscal policies and rules in Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). It makes proposals
to strengthen fiscal policy governance that go
well beyond the legislation set to be adopted
in autumn 2011. The authors consider these
additional governance measures to be essential
for effective policy coordination and sound
public finances in the future.

Hier gibt's das vollständige Paper.

Wie entstand die dramatische Situation in Europa?

Paul Krugman schildert seine Sicht auf die Entstehung der dramatisch angespannten Lage in der Eurozone:

As I see it, the underlying eurozone story is pretty clear and simple. After the creation of the euro, investors developed a false sense of security about lending to peripheral economies; this led to large capital flows from the core to the periphery, and corresponding current account imbalances [...] These capital inflows also caused a boom in the periphery that raised costs and prices dramatically compared with the core [...]

Now all of that has to be unwound. So how is that supposed to happen?

It seems obvious that spending cuts in the periphery have to be offset by spending increases in the core, and also that a way has to be found to make the required real depreciation in the periphery feasible. But eurozone policy is for austerity everywhere, and a low inflation target for the area as a whole, which means crippling deflation in the periphery.

Weihnachtseinkäufe stehen an, oder: Warum amerikanische Haushalte weniger sparen als europäische

Over the past three decades, Germany, France, Austria and Belgium have maintained household saving rates between 10 and 13 percent, and rates in Sweden recently soared to 13 percent. By contrast, saving rates in the United States dropped to nearly zero by 2005; they rose above 5 percent after the 2008 crisis but have recently fallen below 4 percent.

Unlike the United States, the thrifty societies of Europe have long histories of encouraging the broad populace to save. During the 19th century, European reformers and governments became preoccupied with creating prudent citizens. Civic groups founded hundreds of savings banks that enabled the masses to save by accepting small deposits. Central governments established accessible postal savings banks, whereby small savers could bank at any post office. To inculcate thrifty habits in the young, governments also instituted school savings banks. During the two world wars, citizens everywhere were bombarded with messages to save. Savings campaigns continued long after 1945 in Europe and Japan to finance reconstruction. [...]

The United States emerged from the war with unparalleled prosperity and hardly needed further savings campaigns. Instead politicians, businessmen and labor leaders all promoted consumption as the new driver of economic growth. Rather than democratize saving, the American system rapidly democratized credit. An array of federal housing and tax policies enabled Americans to borrow to buy homes and products as no other people could.

But from the 1980s, financial deregulation and new tax legislation spurred the growth of credit cards, home equity loans, subprime mortgages and predatory lending. Soaring home prices emboldened the financial industry to make housing and consumer loans that many Americans could no longer repay. Still, Americans wondered, why save when it is so easy to borrow? Only after housing prices collapsed in 2008 did they discover that wealth on paper is not the same as money in the bank.

Quelle: NYTimes

Bild mit Symbolcharakter?!

Quelle: FTAlphaville