European industrial production post 1929, from League of Nations, versus European industrial production post 2007, from Eurostat. Better this time, but not as much as you might think — and stalling:
Mittwoch, 21. März 2012
Krugman on Europe's economy
Sonntag, 18. März 2012
Fiscal Policy in a liquidity trap: New paper by DeLong and Summers coming up
DeLong and Summers "argue at greater length, [that] [...] there is very little direct connection between spending over the next couple of years and long-run fiscal prospects. Between low borrowing costs and high multipliers, spending now would do little to worsen the debt picture a decade from now; indeed, as DeLong-Summers argue (and some of us have been arguing, less formally, for a while now), there’s a plausible case that spending more now actually improves the long-run fiscal picture — and that austerity worsens it."
This paper can be expected to trigger a lot of discussion and controversy in the academic and political world; especially in the US, but probably in Europe as well.
Sonntag, 11. März 2012
The rise and fall of Keynesianism during the Great Recession
Farrell, Henry; Quiggin, John: Consensus, Dissensus and Economic Ideas: The Rise and Fall
of Keynesianism During the Economic Crisis
Samstag, 10. März 2012
Montag, 5. März 2012
What's wrong with economics in the crisis?
To say the obvious: we’re now in the fourth year of a truly nightmarish economic crisis. I like to think that I was more prepared than most for the possibility that such a thing might happen; developments in Asia in the late 1990s badly shook my faith in the widely accepted proposition that events like those of the 1930s could never happen again. But even pessimists like me, even those who realized that the age of bank runs and liquidity traps was not yet over, failed to realize how bad a crisis was waiting to happen – and how grossly inadequate the policy response would be when it did happen.
Read more
Samstag, 3. März 2012
Zu Tode sparen?
Das Gros der politischen Verantwortungsträger streut sich Sand in die Augen, seit die Staatsschuldenkrise europäischer Länder in den medialen und politischen Fokus rückte: Die radikale Sanierung von Staatshaushalten durch sofortige und kompromisslose Ausgabenkürzungen werde das Vertrauen in die Zukunftsfähigkeit der jeweils betroffenen Volkswirtschaften stärken, heißt es allerorten; Konsum und Investitionen würden wieder zu blühen beginnen, sobald der Dämon der Schuldenmacherei ausgetrieben sei; sodann werde Europa, das gebeutelte, strauchelnde wirtschaftliche Europa, in neuem Glanz erstrahlen.
Der Glaube daran, dass kontraktive Fiskalpolitik nicht nur lang-, sondern sogar kurz- und mittelfristig auf mysteriöse Weise Wirtschaftswachstum bringen kann, ist eine gigantische Illusion, die nicht dazu angetan ist, Europa den Weg in eine bessere Zukunft zu weisen.
Mittwoch, 15. Februar 2012
Das Dilemma der Griechen: Extrem oder vielleicht noch extremer leiden?
Vor diesem Hintergrund hat sich auch Jeremy Warner vom Telegraph gefragt, ob es aus der Sicht der Griechen wirklich die bessere Option ist, die Abhängigkeit gegenüber seinen ausländischen Gläubigern aufrechtzuerhalten und sich dem rigorosen Spardiktat der Troika zu unterwerfen. Seine Antwort dürfte so manchen überraschen:
Repeated rounds of austerity are proving self defeating, which makes it virtually certain that Greece will eventually have to come back for more. What are Europe's paymasters to demand then?Quelle: TelegraphThat ordinary Greeks be further punished for the sins and omissions of the old political and business elite? They've already been driven close to open rebellion. Morally and socially, it cannot be right to push them any further. To keep on demanding more is no longer an economic strategy, but a form of sadistic vindictiveness, designed, perhaps deliberately, to back the country into a corner.
What is more, experience in Argentina and other countries that have both devalued and defaulted suggest that the economic shock of exiting a fixed exchange rate is relatively short lived.
Once competitiveness has been restored by devaluation and default, growth prospects improve dramatically. The short sharp shock of exit is very likely better than the death by a thousand cuts implied by continued membership.