Christie Romer über Fiskalpolitik in den USA

The one thing that has disillusioned me is the discussion of fiscal policy. Policymakers and far too many economists seem to be arguing from ideology rather than evidence… [T]he evidence is stronger than it has ever been that fiscal policy matters—that fiscal stimulus helps the economy add jobs, and that reducing the budget deficit lowers growth at least in the near term. And yet, this evidence does not seem to be getting through to the legislative process.

That is unacceptable. We are never going to solve our problems if we can’t agree at least on the facts. Evidence-based policymaking is essential if we are ever going to triumph over this recession and deal with our long-run budget problems.

Quelle: Berkeley Paper

"Ein Problem, das man nur lösen kann, wenn man es mit Geld überhäuft"

The financial crisis in Europe, seemingly never-ending, has now entered a potentially disastrous phase. [...] there’s a real possibility that the euro zone might just break apart [...] Yet what’s easy to miss, amid the market tremors and the political brinksmanship, is that this is that rarest of problems—one that you really can solve just by throwing money at it.

To be sure, Italy and Spain have genuine troubles: their economies are weak and their debt loads are high. But these problems are manageable as long as the interest rate on their debt stays reasonably low. (This is in contrast to Greece, which had no hope of ever paying off all its debts.) Italy’s fiscal situation is not good, but it’s not much worse than it was a decade ago. Indeed, it’s one of only a small handful of countries in the developed world that are running a so-called primary surplus [...] The problem, then, isn’t the debt itself but, rather, the soaring interest rates, and these are driven more by fear than by economic fundamentals. [...] fear of default raises interest rates, and higher interest rates make default more likely.

The frustrating thing about all this is that there is a ready-made solution. If the European Central Bank were to commit publicly to backstopping Italian and Spanish debt, by buying as many of their bonds as needed, the worries about default would recede and interest rates would fall. This wouldn’t cure the weakness of the Italian economy or eliminate the hangover from the housing bubble in Spain, but it would avert a Lehman-style meltdown, buy time for economic reforms to work, and let these countries avoid the kind of over-the-top austerity measures that will worsen the debt crisis by killing any prospect of economic growth.

Quelle: The New Yorker

Paul Krugman mutmaßt über die zukünftige Geschichtsschreibung der Jahre 2010/2011

Future historians will look back in astonishment at the Great Pivot of 2010, in which all the Very Serious People on both sides of the Atlantic– and, sad to say, in both parties in the United States — decided that in the face of high unemployment, weak growth, and low inflation, what the world really needed was austerity.

Quelle: NYTimes

Reformüberlegungen zum Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt in der EU

Das Abstract eines Papers, das sich mit der prekären Lage der Europäischen Währungsunion und möglichen Gegenmaßnahmen befasst, liest sich folgendermaßen:

The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is a
symptom of policy failures and defi ciencies in –
among other things – fi scal policy coordination.
The first nine years of the euro were not used
effectively in order to improve public finances,
while the Stability and Growth Pact was
watered down. Spillovers from the financial and
economic crisis compounded fiscal difficulties
in the euro area, especially in certain member
countries. This paper looks back at the history
of fiscal policies and rules in Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). It makes proposals
to strengthen fiscal policy governance that go
well beyond the legislation set to be adopted
in autumn 2011. The authors consider these
additional governance measures to be essential
for effective policy coordination and sound
public finances in the future.

Hier gibt's das vollständige Paper.

Wie entstand die dramatische Situation in Europa?

Paul Krugman schildert seine Sicht auf die Entstehung der dramatisch angespannten Lage in der Eurozone:

As I see it, the underlying eurozone story is pretty clear and simple. After the creation of the euro, investors developed a false sense of security about lending to peripheral economies; this led to large capital flows from the core to the periphery, and corresponding current account imbalances [...] These capital inflows also caused a boom in the periphery that raised costs and prices dramatically compared with the core [...]

Now all of that has to be unwound. So how is that supposed to happen?

It seems obvious that spending cuts in the periphery have to be offset by spending increases in the core, and also that a way has to be found to make the required real depreciation in the periphery feasible. But eurozone policy is for austerity everywhere, and a low inflation target for the area as a whole, which means crippling deflation in the periphery.

Weihnachtseinkäufe stehen an, oder: Warum amerikanische Haushalte weniger sparen als europäische

Over the past three decades, Germany, France, Austria and Belgium have maintained household saving rates between 10 and 13 percent, and rates in Sweden recently soared to 13 percent. By contrast, saving rates in the United States dropped to nearly zero by 2005; they rose above 5 percent after the 2008 crisis but have recently fallen below 4 percent.

Unlike the United States, the thrifty societies of Europe have long histories of encouraging the broad populace to save. During the 19th century, European reformers and governments became preoccupied with creating prudent citizens. Civic groups founded hundreds of savings banks that enabled the masses to save by accepting small deposits. Central governments established accessible postal savings banks, whereby small savers could bank at any post office. To inculcate thrifty habits in the young, governments also instituted school savings banks. During the two world wars, citizens everywhere were bombarded with messages to save. Savings campaigns continued long after 1945 in Europe and Japan to finance reconstruction. [...]

The United States emerged from the war with unparalleled prosperity and hardly needed further savings campaigns. Instead politicians, businessmen and labor leaders all promoted consumption as the new driver of economic growth. Rather than democratize saving, the American system rapidly democratized credit. An array of federal housing and tax policies enabled Americans to borrow to buy homes and products as no other people could.

But from the 1980s, financial deregulation and new tax legislation spurred the growth of credit cards, home equity loans, subprime mortgages and predatory lending. Soaring home prices emboldened the financial industry to make housing and consumer loans that many Americans could no longer repay. Still, Americans wondered, why save when it is so easy to borrow? Only after housing prices collapsed in 2008 did they discover that wealth on paper is not the same as money in the bank.

Quelle: NYTimes

Bild mit Symbolcharakter?!

Quelle: FTAlphaville

Langsame Entscheidungsprozesse in der EU

Tim Duy trifft den Nagel auf den Kopf, wenn er sich auf das zentrale Problem hinsichtlich der Forderung nach EU-Vertragsänderungen bezieht:

It should be painfully evident at this point that any process toward greater fiscal integration will be a years-long process. Financial markets, however, move at something much closer to the speed of light - as fast as traders can hit the "sell" button. As such, the European political process is grossly incapable of addressing the fiscal crisis.

Angela Merkel ist der Auffassung, dass durch Sanktionsmechanismen, die im Zuge von EU-Vertragsänderungen eingeführt werden sollen, Schuldenstaaten zu bestrafen sind:

Ms Merkel instead used a three-way summit with France and Italy in Strasbourg to insist that new treaty powers to intervene and punish sinner states remained the key focus of Europe's rescue efforts. She said: "The countries who don't keep to the stability pact have to be punished – those who contravene it need to be penalised. We need to make sure this doesn't happen again."

Als "key focus of Europe's rescue efforts" kann das allerdings nicht taugen. Denn bis sich die 27 Mitgliedstaaten durch den langwierigen Verträgerungsänderungsprozess kämpfen, hätten die Teilnehmer an den Anleihemärkten schon lange die Geduld verloren und die angeschlagenen EU-Staaten mit Zinserhöhungen in die Knie gezwungen.

Das Problem "Too Big To Fail" bleibt ungelöst

Simon Johnson macht sich darüber Gedanken, wie die Ansteckungsgefahr im Falle des Scheiterns einer Großbank gemessen werden kann:

How are we to know if a particular event, like deciding not to bail out a big bank, will lead to contagion that spreads to other financial markets? Contagion is the key issue.

In Europe, the failure of just one large bank can do macroeconomic damage; governments there have let individual banks build balance sheets that are bigger than the country’s gross domestic product. In the United States, we too should fear megabanks; the big six bank-holding companies have become much bigger in recent years and now have combined assets worth more than 65 percent of G.D.P. [...]

People see one bank failure and fear the consequences – hence, panics and runs on the bank. Anyone who thinks that we solved this problem with forward-thinking central banks or fiscal interventions has not been paying close attention – either to the United States or to Europe – over the last three years.

We really need transparency on the exact exposures of banks. To whom have they lent and on what basis? Just telling supervisors does not help us at all, because sharing information only behind closed doors is just another potential mechanism for regulatory capture.

For large financial institutions – those with more than $100 billion in total assets – everything should be out in the open. If you want to operate in relative secrecy, stay small. The costs of today’s opaqueness are huge, creating the basis for the plea, “Save us or you’ll lose the world.”

Quelle: NYTimes

Krise, Krise, Krise, wohin man auch blickt

Manchmal läge man lieber falsch als richtig.

Wir sind dieser Tage permanent mit Krisenthemen konfrontiert. Auch wenn dies heute fast unvorstellbar erscheinen mag, so hegten vor einem Jahr doch immer noch viele Menschen die hehre Hoffnung, dass das Schlimmste bereits hinter uns liegen möge. Heute wird allerorts der verzweifelten Hoffnung Ausdruck verliehen, dass wenigstens das Worst Case Szenario abgewendet werden könne. Was ich vor etwas mehr als einem Jahr schrieb, hat sich leider bewahrheitet. Der Beitrag trug den Titel "Die nächste Krise ist nur eine Frage der Zeit":

Ich habe hier bereits wiederholt argumentiert, dass die bislang getroffenen Reformmaßnahmen im internationalen Finanzsystem sich sehr wahrscheinlich als unzureichend herausstellen werden. Krisen im Finanzsektor lassen sich zwar natürlich ohnehin nicht zur Gänze verhindern; kein noch so gutes Regulierungsregime kann daran etwas ändern, wie eine Beschäftigung mit der Geschichte der internationalen Finanzmärkte sehr deutlich zeigt (vgl. Rogoff und Reinhart (2009): This Time is Different. Eight Centuries of Financial Folly). Die politschen Verantwortlichen haben jedoch die Pflicht, mit entsprechenden Regulierungen sicherzustellen, dass Krisen punktueller Natur bleiben und nicht zum Flächenbrand werden. Die "Reformer" haben es bislang leider sträflich verabsäumt, dieser ihrer Regulierungspflicht zufriedenstellend nachzukommen. Die Realwirtschaft darf im Falle von schlechtem Risikomanagement einzelner Finanzinstitutionen nicht in Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden.

Das zentrale Problem in den Anreizstrukturen hat weiterhin Bestand, weil sich die Reformverantwortlichen auf beiden Seiten des Atlantik nicht gegen die Lobby der großen Finanzinstitutionen durchsetzen können/wollen. Das Risiko einer neuerlichen Systemkrise ist weiterhin gegeben, solange das Problem von Finanzinstitutionen, die als "too big to fail" gelten, nicht gelöst wird. Und die jüngsten Vorkommnisse in den USA zeigen, dass sich die Vorgehensweise bei den großen Banken, welche es meisterhaft verstehen, Regulierungen zu umgehen und die Beschleunigung von Geschäftsprozessen bis über alle Qualitätsgrenzen hinaus auszureizen, nicht ändern wird, solange kein neues Regulierungsregime in Kraft ist, das seinen Namen auch verdient.

Wir sollten uns alle Mervyn Kings Zitat des Tages zu Herzen nehmen:

The words “banking” and “crises” are natural bedfellows. If love and marriage go together like a horse and carriage, then banking and crisis go together like Oxford and the Isis, intertwined for as long as anyone can remember.

Und daraus die richtigen Schlüsse ziehen.

Leider kann ich heute nichts davon zurücknehmen.

Es ist düster, sehr, sehr düster an den Anleihemärkten

The bad news out of Europe is coming fast and thick now. Markets were still digesting news of Spain's terrible bond auction yesterday, in which the yield on its 3-month debt more than doubled, from 2.3% to over 5%. That was but an appetizer, however; in an auction of 10-year debt today, Germany failed to place some 40% of the issuance. The lack of appetite for German debt has come as a shock to many, and the language being used to describe matters is increasingly apocalyptic. "It is a complete and utter disaster", Reuters has one strategist saying. On the secondary market, German bond yields have finally joined those of its neighbours on their upward march. The German 10-year yield is up sharply today [...] and back above 2%. It still has a way to go to catch France and Austria (approaching 4%), Belgium (over 5%), and Spain and Italy (back near 7%).

Quelle: The Economist

In Frankreich bläst ein Sturm durchs Gebälk

Investors aren’t waiting for Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s Investors Service to strip France, Europe’s second-biggest economy, of its top credit rating.

The extra yield demanded to lend to AAA rated France for 10 years was 158 basis points more than the German rate at 11:51 a.m. today. The gap was 200 basis points on Nov. 17, the widest spread since 1990, up from 28 in April. The French 10-year yield was at 3.5 percent, about midway between top-rated Holland and Belgium, which is graded one level lower at Aa1 by Moody’s. French borrowing costs are more than a percentage point above the AAA rated U.K. [...]

The debt crisis that began more than two years ago in Greece and snared Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain is close to reaching France. Moody’s said in a report published yesterday that any persistent increase in borrowing costs would amplify the French government’s challenges as economic growth slows.

Quelle: Bloomberg

Paul Krugman über Österreich

Der renommierte, deshalb aber nicht weniger umstrittene bärtige Professor bloggte heute über Österreich:

Austria is, by most comparisons, a very successful economy, with low unemployment and a current account surplus. Its fiscal outlook is slightly better than Germany’s, according to IMF projections:

Yet Austria has had almost exactly the same interest rate experience as France. In June, both Austria and France had 10-year rates of 3.43%, 44 basis points above Germany’s 2.89. As of today, German rates were down to 1.91, but French rates were up to 3.47 — and Austrian rates up to 3.44. Both countries, in other words, have seen their spreads more than triple.

What exactly is going on here? Is the market worried about bank exposure? Is it pricing in a possible euro breakup? Lots to chew on here. But one thing is clear: fiscal rectitude — which the Austrians have displayed even more than the Germans — is no protection.

Quelle: NYTimes

Schluss mit Durchwurschteln?

Jonathan Wilmot über die entscheidende Phase für die Zukunft des Euro:

We seem to have entered the last days of the euro as we currently know it.

That doesn’t make a break-up very likely, but it does mean some extraordinary things will almost certainly need to happen – probably by mid-January – to prevent the progressive closure of all the euro zone sovereign bond markets, potentially accompanied by escalating runs on even the strongest banks.

That may sound overdramatic, but it reflects the inexorable logic of investors realizing that – as things currently stand – they simply cannot be sure what exactly they are holding or buying in the euro zone sovereign bond markets.

In the short run, this cannot be fixed by the ECB or by new governments in Greece, Italy or Spain: it’s about markets needing credible signals on the shape of fiscal and political union long before final treaty changes can take place. We suspect this spells the death of “muddle-through” as market pressures effectively force France and Germany to strike a momentous deal on fiscal union much sooner than currently seems possible, or than either would like. Then and only then do we think the ECB will agree to provide the bridge finance needed to prevent systemic collapse.

We think the debate on fiscal union will really heat up from this week when the Commission publishes a new paper on three different options for mutually guaranteed “Eurobonds”, continue at the summit on 9 December and through a key speech by President Sarkozy to the French nation scheduled for the 20th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty (11 December).

While these discussions may give some short-term relief to markets, it seems likely that the process of reaching agreement will involve some high stakes brinkmanship and market turmoil in subsequent weeks. (Not unlike the US debt ceiling debate this summer, or the messy passage of TARP in 2008.)

One paradox is that pressure on Italian and Spanish bond yields may get quite a lot worse even as their new governments start to deliver reforms – 10-year yields spiking above 9% for a short period is not something one could rule out. For that matter, it’s quite possible that we will see French yields above 5%, and even Bund yields rise during this critical fiscal union debate.

Moreover, this could happen even as the ECB moves more aggressively to lower rates and introduce extra measures to provide banks with longer-term funding. And US bond yields may fall – or at least not rise – despite improving US growth data through end-year. Equally, global equity markets and world wealth could follow a more muted version of their early Q1:2009 sell-off until the political brinkmanship is resolved – see exhibits below.

In short, the fate of the euro is about to be decided. And the pressure for the necessary political breakthroughs will likely come from investors seeking to protect themselves from the utterly catastrophic consequences of a break-up – a scenario that their own fears should ultimately help to prevent.

Quelle: FTAlphaville

Über die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Rezession in den USA

Gathering storms across the Atlantic threaten a U.S. economy not yet recovered from the last recession. ... In the next few months, the odds of recession due to domestic factors appear reasonably contained. ... However, the curve reflecting the international odds suggests more imminent danger to the economy, although this threat is harder to calibrate using historical data and only indirectly reflects the health of the European financial system. Recession odds based on international factors peak at about 45% toward the end of 2011 ... The combination of these two recession coins, shown in the combined risks line of Figure 2, is quite disconcerting. It indicates that the odds are greater than 50% that we will experience a recession sometime early in 2012. Because the international odds of recession are more imprecisely estimated, one must be careful with a strict interpretation of this result. But the message is clear. Prudence suggests that the fragile state of the U.S. economy would not easily withstand turbulence coming across the Atlantic.

Quelle: FRBSF Economic Letter

Furcht und Schrecken auf einen Blick: Die Zins-Spreads europäischer Staatsanleihen in den letzten zwanzig Jahren

Quelle: FTAlphaville

Zur Situation amerikanischer Hypothekenschuldner

A whopping 28.6 percent of homeowners with mortgages owe more on their loans than their homes could sell for, according to quarterly data released Tuesday by Zillow, a real estate website. That’s up from 26.8 percent in the second quarter. Home values declined only 0.2 percent from the second quarter but were down 4.4 percent year over year. The rising percentage of homes with “negative equity” or “underwater” status is due largely to how long the foreclosure sale process takes rather than home value fluctuations, said Zillow chief economist Stan Humphries. Prior to the “robo-signing” scandal around foreclosures that came to light in 2010, the negative equity rate hovered in the 21 to 23 percent range, but has been in the 26 to 28 range since due to added delays in foreclosure sales. While the rate of foreclosures is dropping, the time required for foreclosures to sell has lengthened. “We’re in uncharted waters,” Humphries said in an interview. “More than one in four homes underwater and about 9 percent unemployment is a recipe for more foreclosures.”

Quelle: MSNBC

Siesta oder Rezession?

Aus Spanien kommen schlechte Konjunkturnachrichten:

The economic recovery in Spain has ground to a complete halt. According to first estimates by INE, Spanish real GDP was unchanged in the third quarter (0.8% YoY), after growing a modest 0.2% QoQ in the second quarter. The outcome was less bad than had been suggested by lead indicators such as the purchasing managers’ indices, but bang in line with the initial estimate of the Bank of Spain. No expenditure breakdown is available at this stage, but we suspect that a positive contribution from net exports was offset by a further contraction in domestic demand. [...]

Looking ahead, we fear that the Spanish economy might slip into recession soon – perhaps as soon as the current fourth quarter. Our base case scenario envisages no economic growth in 2012. The worsening economic outlook poses significant risks to Spain’s fiscal consolidation efforts. Indeed, Spain’s budget deficit targets (2011: 6.0% of GDP; 2012: 4.4%) are based on growth assumptions of 1.3% this year and 2.3% in 2012, which seem overly optimistic.

Investors have taken note, with the yield on Spain’s 10 year rising in recent days.

Als kleine, aber deshalb nicht weniger unerfreuliche Randnotiz: Auch die Zinsen für 10-jährige österreichische Staatsanleihen stiegen heute an.

Eine amerikanische Perspektive auf den Höllenritt italienischer Staatsanleihen

Gestern noch verlangten Investoren für 10-jährige italienische Staatsanleihen Zinsen in Höhe von 7,5%. Doch auch wenn zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt (16.23 Uhr mitteleuropäischer Uhrzeit) zumindest ein Absinken auf weniger als 7% zu vermelden ist, so bleibt es dabei, dass Italien bei einem derartigen Zinsniveau seinen Zahlungsverpflichtungen wohl nicht umfänglich nachkommen wird können. Schon sind Gerüchte in Umlauf, wonach die EZB neuerlich intervenieren werde, um der dramatischen Entwicklung bei italienischen Staatsanleihen Einhalt zu gebieten. Merkel und Sarkozy eilen in der Zwischenzeit von Krisentreffen zu Krisentreffen; und Papademos nimmt unter den Argusaugen der europäischen Öffentlichkeit die Aufgabe auf sich, in Griechenland für eine Umsetzung der "Einigung" zu sorgen, die auf dem Krisengipfel vorletzte Woche erreicht worden war.

Welchen Blick hat man in den USA auf die Ereignisse in Europa? Dazu hat Tim Duy einen interessanten Artikel geschrieben. Er wirft unter anderem die Frage auf, was eigentlich die Fed im Angesicht all der gefährlichen Entwicklungen in Europa zu tun gedenkt:

Now where is the Fed in all of this? Quiet, very quiet. To be sure, they will stand ready to provide dollar liquidity via swap agreements with their foreign counterparts. And will likely expand the balance sheet in the event of sharp deceleration in US economic acivity. But such a deceleration is not likely to be revealed in the near term data. And, interestingly, note that despite all the turmoil, the implied inflation rate via the TIPS market is 1.88 and 1.99 at the 5 and 10 year horizons, respectively. I believe the Fed would like to see clearer deflationary pressures before they engaged in another round of QE. [...]

At a minimum, the Fed could be preparing a credit facility to take European sovereign debt as collateral. Beyond that, I find it hard to imagine the Fed making large scale European debt purchases. After all, what will they define as an American financial instituion? Deutsche Bank has a US financial holding company - would a Fed commitment include all of Deutsche Bank's European bond portfolio? I don't think the Fed is ready to make such distinctions, especially after the public relations beating they took for lending to foreign banks during the US financial crisis. [...]

I find it hard to see the Fed eager to take on the role of global lender of last resort. Just as I find it difficult to see the US supporting an expansion of the IMF to aid Europe. Europe has both the capital and the lender of last resort to deal with this crisis themselves. They don't need external financing, they need internal rebalancing. Ultimately, the Europeans will need to find the political willpower to solve the crisis. I just don't see much US involvement in the process, either fiscal or monetary. And if such involvement did occur, it would not happen until conditions became much, much worse. [...]

The Fed is probably still mulling over what they perceive to be the limited US exposure to Europe, just as they did with the US subprime debt. And the relatively painless demise of MF Global probably reinforces that sense of complacency. The Fed will react eventually, but US conditions will need to deteriorate markedly before they do so.

Eines ist klar: Auch in den USA kann es den Notenbankern gar nicht gefallen, was sich derzeit in Europa zuträgt.

Geschichtsklitterung, Wallstreet-Style

One group has been especially vocal about shaping a new narrative of the credit crisis and economic collapse: those whose bad judgment and failed philosophy helped cause the crisis.

Rather than admit the error of their ways — Repent! — these people are engaged in an active campaign to rewrite history. They are not, of course, exonerated in doing so. And beyond that, they damage the process of repairing what was broken. They muddy the waters when it comes to holding guilty parties responsible. They prevent measures from being put into place to prevent another crisis. [...]

Wall Street has its own version: Its Big Lie is that banks and investment houses are merely victims of the crash. You see, the entire boom and bust was caused by misguided government policies. It was not irresponsible lending or derivative or excess leverage or misguided compensation packages, but rather long-standing housing policies that were at fault. [...]

The Big Lie made a surprise appearance Tuesday when New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, responding to a question about Occupy Wall Street, stunned observers by exonerating Wall Street: “It was not the banks that created the mortgage crisis. It was, plain and simple, Congress who forced everybody to go and give mortgages to people who were on the cusp.”

Den ganzen Artikel gibt es in der Washington Post.

Hohe Volatilität. Aber wohin geht die Reise?

RARELY has a stock market been so wild and moved so little.

Over the last three months, there has been day after day of wild swings in prices. Stocks soar when it appears that Europe will manage to work out a rescue plan for Greece. They plunge when it appears the world may be entering a double-dip recession.

But the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index has moved almost nowhere. An investor who spent the last three months in private contemplation, without any information about what was going on, could have emerged this week and concluded, from the stock market, that it had been a quiet time for all. [...]

Much of the downward volatility of the last three months came on speculation that a new recession might be starting. Moves upward, meanwhile, came when economic optimism rose. The high level of excess volatility could signal that the economy’s recent slow growth is due to change — but it is not clear what that change might be.

Quelle: NY Times

Die Geisterbahnfahrt auf den Anleihenmärkten geht weiter

The difference between the German and Italian sovereign 10-year bond yields widened on Friday to a record of 4.57 percentage points.

The difference in the cost of borrowing for the two countries widened because money flowed into safe-haven German bonds, pushing down the fixed interest on those bonds, while concern about the state of Italy's public finances sent Italian rates up.

The yield on 10-year Italian debt also rose to a record high point, putting Italy close to levels at which financing its debt mountain is widely considered to be unsustainable.

Quelle: AFP

Ein Hinweis auf die Zahlen am amerikanischen Arbeitsmarkt

Die Arbeitslosigkeit in den USA liegt laut offiziellen Angaben bei 9,1%, und ist damit mehr als doppelt so hoch wie vor dem Ausbruch der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise im Jahr 2007. Diese Zahlen sind besorgniserregend schlimm. In Wahrheit sind sie aber noch viel schlimmer:

According to the BLS, the American workforce (employed plus unemployed people) has actually shrunk since October 2008. It doesn’t seem to make sense, given most estimates tend to suggest the US population is growing at 1.0% per year, in part due to immigration. We would expect labour force growth to slow due to the retiring cohort of baby boomers and peak in the participation of women in the labour force. But it shouldn’t be negative.

The reason it is negative is because the BLS doesn’t count those who are marginally attached or discouraged from entering the labour force (as shown above, around 11.4m people). This has the result of reducing the size of the labour force, resulting in a lower unemployment rate percentage. This is why the official unemployment rate is much lower than the broader U-6 measure and has actually been falling. More and more people are becoming so disenchanted with their job prospects that they have simply stopped looking for a job.

Gründe dafür, warum Chinas Volkswirtschaft eine harte Landung erleben könnte

Die japanische Investmentbank Nomura hat einen neuen Bericht veröffentlicht, in dem es um die Zukunftsaussichten der chinesischen Wirtschaft geht:

A new Nomura report puts the odds at one-in-three of a hard landing in China in the next three years, which they define as four consecutive quarters of sequential GDP growth at 5 per cent or less.

Mehr gibt es hier.

Staasverschuldung in der Eurozone, gemessen am BIP

via FTAlphaville

Wirtschaftsblogger sind nicht allzu optimistisch, was die kurz- und mittelfristige Entwicklung der amerikanischen Volkswirtschaft anbelangt

Using words like "uncertain," "fragile" and "weak," 96 percent of top economics bloggers now share a gloomy outlook on the U.S. economy. According to a new Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation survey released today, respondents' expectations of higher annual deficits and top marginal tax rate increases, coupled with recession concerns, are a "depressing surprise."

Quelle: Kauffman Foundation

"EFSF ist zum Scheitern verurteilt"

Louise Bowman ist überzeugt davon, dass die Art und Weise, wie der EU-Rettungsschirm für hochverschuldete Länder aufgestellt wurde, nichts Gutes erahnen lässt.

Wenn Spaniens Rosen welken und vergehen

Spain's economy growth ground to a halt in the third quarter, the country's central bank said Monday, further raising doubts over the government's deficit-reduction goal.

The Bank of Spain blamed stagnant growth on a number of factors, including a drop in domestic demand in a country with a 21.5 percent jobless rate.

The latest piece of bad news came just three days after the government announced the new, unemployment rate. It means nearly 5 million people are now out of work in a country of about 47 million.

Quelle: AP

Das sind keine guten Nachrichten; denn wenn Spanien seine Ziele zur Defizitreduktion nicht erreichen kann, wird die Zinsbelastung an den Anleihenmärkten steigen. Und der schöne EFSF, den sich die EU mühevoll zusammengebastelt hat, könnte sich trotz Hebelung bald als unzureichend herausstellen.